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FAMILY LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Family law was last surveyed in the New Mexico Law Review in the
Fall of 1989. That survey addressed developments in the field of domestic
relations from April 1, 1987 through February 1, 1988. This article
examines the impact of family law cases decided by New Mexico appellate
courts from February 1988 through August 1990.
During the survey period, few major developments occurred in family
law jurisprudence in the state. The period was characterized by the
evolution and refinement of existing case law. In many of the cases
surveyed, the appellate courts provided insight into their current thinking
on child custody, child support, and community property issues.
II. CHILD CUSTODY
A. Rights of Non-Custodial Parents
Under New Mexico law, placing a child in the custody of one parent
in a divorce action does not extinguish the non-custodial parent's right
to custody,' nor does it constitute an adverse determination of the fitness
of the non-custodial parent. 2 In a custody dispute between a natural
parent and a third party, the natural parent is entitled to custody of the
child unless the third party makes an affirmative showing that the parent
is unfit.3 This subject was addressed by the New Mexico Court of Appeals
in In re Mary L. 4
In that case, a mother appealed a district court order finding that she
neglected her three children, giving legal and physical custody of the
children to the Human Services Department ("Department"), and re-
quiring her to abide by the provisions of a treatment plan.' The mother's
three children were all born or conceived during her marriage to the
children's father. 6 In 1977, the mother left the father, who then obtained
a divorce in Texas. 7 He was awarded custody of the children. 8 Thereafter,
the mother saw relatively little of the children, in part because the father
threatened to kill her should she attempt to contact them, and in part
because the father was a migrant worker who took the children with
him on his travels.9
1. Roberts v. Staples, 79 N.M. 298, 442 P.2d 788 (1968).
2. Id.
3. Shorty v. Scott, 87 N.M. 490, 553 P.2d 1341 (1975); Greene v. French, 97 N.M. 493, 641
P.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1982).
4. 108 N.M. 702, 778 P.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1989).
5. Id. at 703, 778 P.2d at 450.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 703-04, 778 P.2d 450-51.
8. Id. at 703, 778 P. 2d at 450.
9. Id.
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In December of 1985, while in Clovis, New Mexico, the oldest daughter,
then twelve, confided in one of her aunts that her father had been
sexually abusing her for the past four years.' 0 The Department filed an
abuse petition against the father and asked the court to adjudicate the
children abused and give physical and legal custody to the Department."
The mother did not receive notice of the action, was not joined as a
party, and did not participate in the proceedings.12
Shortly thereafter, the mother asked for custody of her children. 3 The
Department informed her that it could not grant her custody until its
Texas counterpart performed a home study. 14 The study was completed
and forwarded to the Department in October of 1986, but it provided
a negative assessment of her fitness as a mother." In the meantime, the
father had agreed to relinquish custody of the children. 16
In a combined adjudicatory and dispositional hearing, the trial court
found that the children were neglected by both parents and ordered that
the Department retain legal and physical custody of the children. 7 The
mother appealed, contending that she was automatically entitled to custody
of the children in January of 1985 and that her custody should not have
been conditioned on the home study. 8 She argued on appeal that her
right to raise her children is a liberty interest protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. 9
In addition, she argued that the state could not deprive her of custody
of her children without providing her with due process, which, in the
context of her case, would include notice of alleged unfitness and an
opportunity to be heard on that allegation in a judicial forum. 20
The Department argued, without citing any authority, that the mother
was previously deprived of her right to raise her children by the Texas
divorce decree, which gave custody of the children to the father. 2' The
Department further argued that once the children were removed from
the father's custody, it was prohibited from giving the mother custody
of the children.22 Finally, the Department argued that non-custodial par-
ents are not entitled to the same constitutional rights as custodial parents. 23
The court of appeals found that a custody decree in a divorce action
determines custody only between the parents.2 Following New Mexico
10. Id. at 704, 778 P.2d at 451.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 704-05, 778 P.2d at 451-52; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
20. In re Mary L., 108 N.M at 705, 778 P.2d at 452; see also Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566
F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977).
21. In re Mary L., 108 N.M. at 705, 778 P.2d at 452.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
[Vol. 21
Summer 1991]
common law, the court determined that once the mother was notified
of the judicial proceedings and indicated a desire to have custody of the
children, the Department was required either to relinquish custody to her
or to file a legal action to establish its right to custody.2 5 The court held
that a non-custodial parent is not merely a placement alternative, but is
entitled to custody unless the Department can establish that he or she
is unfit.26
B. The Role of the Children's Court
After a child has been adjudicated neglected or abused, the children's
court initiates periodic reviews of the child's status. 27 The purpose of
these reviews is to determine whether the Human Services Department
has made reasonable efforts to institute a treatment plan for the parent
or guardian, and whether the parent or guardian has made some effort
to comply with the plan.28 The children's court then determines whether
it is in the best interest of the child to continue legal custody in the
Department, to transfer legal custody, or to terminate parental rights. 29
However, the authority of the children's court to act in periodic reviews
is limited by the Children's Code ("Code").30 Although the Code au-
thorizes the children's court to order that legal custody remain with the
Department, the Code does not grant the court the power to dictate to
the Department where the child should be placed.3
In In re Jacinta M.,32 the Department appealed a children's court order
entered after a periodic review.3 The child had been previously neglected
and abused and placed in the legal and physical custody of the Department,
which in 1987 stated its intention to place the child with her brother in
California.34 A home study performed on the brother by the California
Social Services Department was "very positive." 35 Both the child's guard-
ian ad litem and the child's biological mother were in favor of placing
the child with her brother.36
Despite evidence to the contrary, the children's court found that the
brother could not provide a proper environment for his sister because
of his homosexuality, and that it was not in the child's best interest to
25. Id. at 706, 778 P.2d at 453.
26. Id. at 705, 778 P.2d at 452 (citing Miske v. Department of Children & Family Servs., 110
Ill. App. 3d 278, 442 N.E.2d 273 (1982)).
27. N.M. STAT ANN. § 32-1-38.1(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
28. § 32-1-38.1(C).
29. § 32-1-38.1(F).
30. See In re Doe, 88 N.M. 632, 545 P.2d 491 (Ct. App. 1975).
31. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-38.1(F) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
32. 107 N.M. 769, 764 P.2d 1327 (Ct. App. 1988).
33. Id. at 770, 764 P.2d at 1328.
34. Id. at 771, 764 P.2d at 1329.
35. Id. "[The brother] was living in a desirable area of Los Angeles, had completed three years
toward his bachelor's degree, and was a supervisor earning a good salary at his place of employment."
Id.
36. Id.
FAMILY LAW
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
be placed with him.17 The children's court ordered that the child remain
in the legal and physical custody of the Department, which placed her
in foster care and appealed the decision."a
The court of appeals concluded that once legal custody was given to
the Department, the children's court had no authority to prohibit it from
placing physical custody of the child with any particular person. 9 The
court based its conclusion on the statutes which define the scope of the
children's court's authority. 4°
Although the court limited its holding to the abuse of power by the
children's court, it pointed out that the court's disapproval of morals
or other personal characteristics cannot be used to determine the fitness
of a person to care for a child. 4' In so concluding, the court did not
suggest that a person's associational or sexual conduct is irrelevant. 42 It
merely stated that there must be compelling evidence that such conduct
has a significant bearing on the best interests of the child in order for
the conduct to be relevant in custody determinations. 3
C. Religious Beliefs and Practices
The issue of whether a non-custodial parent may encourage his or her
children to participate in a particular religion is a matter of first impression
in New Mexico. In Khalsa v. Khalsa,44 the court of appeals provided
guidance as to the scope of a court's intervention in religious beliefs and
practices in child custody disputes.
The parties in Khalsa were married in 1973. 45 At that time, they were
Sikhs and practiced the Sikh religion 6 Two children were born during
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1-38.1(F), 32-1-3(J) (Repl. Pamp. 1989 & Supp. 1990)).
Based on its findings, the court shall order one of the following dispositions:
(1) permit the child to remain with his parent, guardian or custodian subject
to those conditions and limitations the court may prescribe....
(2) transfer or continue legal custody of the child to any of the following:
(a) the human services department . . . or
(b) a relative or other individual . .. qualified to receive and care for the
child.
(3) dismiss the action and return the child to his parent without supervision.
(4) continue the child in the legal custody of the human services department
with or without any required parental involvement in a treatment plan.
(5) make additional orders regarding the treatment plan or placement of the
child to protect the child's best interests if the court determines the department
has failed in implementing any material provision of the treatment plan or abused
its discretion in the placement of the child.
§ 32-1-38.1(F).
41. In re Jacinta M., 107 N.M. at 772, 764 P.2d at 1330; see also Boone v. Boone, 90 N.M.
466, 565 P.2d 337 (1977).
42. In re Jacinta M., 107 N.M. at 772, 764 P.2d at 1330.
43. Id. (citing D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. App. 1981) (homosexuality standing alone,
without evidence of any adverse effect upon welfare of children, would not render wife unfit to
have custody as a matter of law)).
44. 107 N.M. 31, 751 P.2d 715 (Ct. App. 1988).
45. Id. at 32, 751 P.2d at 716.
46. Id.
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the marriage, and the family observed the requirements of their religion. 47
The marriage ended in 1982 when the mother filed an uncontested
petition for divorce. 48 The divorce was granted, and the mother was
awarded sole custody of the two children. 49 In 1983, the mother abandoned
the Sikh religion and began discouraging the children from practicing
Sikhism.50 The father objected to the children not being raised as Sikhs,
and, in 1984, filed a motion requesting sole custody or, in the alternative,
joint custody of the children."
In December 1986, the trial court found that a material change in
circumstances had occurred since the court's last permanent order of
custody, but concluded that joint custody was not in the children's best
interests.12 Furthermore, the court ordered that the children not participate
voluntarily or involuntarily in any Sikh religious activities. 3 The father
appealed.54
The court of appeals relied on established New Mexico law, which
states that the best interest and welfare of the children are the primary
and controlling considerations in child custody matters." The court ex-
panded the application of this principle, applying it specifically to conflicts
between the parents regarding the religious faith and training of their
children . 6 The court of appeals found that the role of the judiciary is
to maintain an attitude of strict impartiality between religions . 7 Courts
should not disqualify any applicant from custody because of his religious
beliefs or restrain any person having custody or visitation rights from
taking the children to a particular church, unless there is a clear and
affirmative showing that the conflicting religions affect the general welfare
of the children.58
The resulting question is what kind of evidence is needed to show that
the conflicting religious beliefs are affecting the general welfare of the
child. The court attempted to demonstrate the evidence required by
discussing the approach used in other jurisdictions.
Generally, physical or emotional harm to a child cannot be assumed
but must be demonstrated in detail.5 9 A custodial parent's general tes-
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 32-33, 751 P.2d at 716-17.
52. Id. at 33, 751 P.2d at 717.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 35-36, 751 P.2d at 719-20 (citing Schuermann v. Schuermann, 94 N.M. 81, 607 P.2d
619 (1980)).
56. Id. at 36, 751 P.2d at 720 (citing Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wash. 2d 810, 489 P.2d 1133 (1971)
(en banc)).
57. Id. (citing Munoz, 79 Wash. 2d at 812-13, 489 P.2d at 1135).
58. Id. (citing Munoz, 79 Wash. 2d at 812-13, 489 P.2d at 1135).
59. Id. (citing Hanson v. Hanson, 404 N.W.2d 460 (N.D. 1987); Felton v. Felton, 383 Mass.
232, 418 N.E.2d 606 (1981)).
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timony that the child is upset or confused because of the non-custodial
parent's religious practice is insufficient to demonstrate harm.6°
The court also cited cases upholding religious restrictions placed upon
visitation rights where there was substantial evidence of physical or
emotional harm to the child. 6' In summary, the court adopted the view
expressed in Munoz v. Munoz62 that courts should adhere to a policy
of impartiality between religions and should intervene in this sensitive
and constitutionally-protected area only if there is a clear and affirmative
showing of harm to a child.63 Court restrictions on religion present the
danger that court-imposed limitations will unconstitutionally infringe upon
a parent's freedom of worship, or they may at least be perceived as
having that effect. 64
D. Intervention in Custody Determinations
According to the rules of the children's court, a parent who is not
alleged to have neglected or abused a child may make a motion to
intervene in a custody proceeding. 65 The commentary to the rule envisioned
that this motion would be similar to an application for permissive in-
tervention. 6 The trial court has discretion in determining whether to allow
intervention. Upon review, the appellate court will not reverse the trial
court's decision unless there is a showing of abuse of discretion. 67
In In re Melvin B. ,6s a stepmother appealed the denial of her motion
to intervene in a matter concerning an adjudicated neglected and abused
child. The stepmother, Ms. Voelkel, was briefly married to the father,
Melvin B., Sr. 69 In April of 1988, Melvin B., Jr. began living with Melvin
B., Sr. and Ms. Voelkel in Ohio. 70 Ms. Voelkel, as a stepparent, assisted
in caring for Melvin B., Jr.71
60. Id. (Parent's speculation that six-year-old son who attended both Mormon services with his
mother and Catholic services with his father was emotionally harmed thereby, was insufficient. The
court concluded that duality of religious beliefs, does not, per se, create a conflict upon young
minds.) (citing Munoz, 79 Wash. 2d at 812-13, 489 P.2d at 1135).
61. Id. at 36-37, 751 P.2d at 720-21; see Funk v. Ossman, 150 Ariz. 578, 724 P.2d 1247 (Ct.
App. 1986) (court upheld order enjoining non-custodial parent from taking his eight-year-old son
to formal Jewish religious training; evidence presented at trial included the testimony of three
psychologists, one of whom testified that the child's anxiety problems, manifested in encopresis,
were caused by the religious differences of his parents).
62. 79 Wash. 2d 810, 489 P.2d 1133 (1971) (en banc).
63. Khalsa, 107 N.M. at 37, 751 P.2d at 721.
64. Id.
65. N.M. CHILDREN'S CT. R. 10-108.
66. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-024(B). "Permissive Intervention: Upon timely application anyone may
be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a conditional right to intervene
or; (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question law or fact in
common." Id.
67. See Apodaca v. Town of Tome Land Grant, 86 N.M. 132, 520 P.2d 552 (1974).
68. 109 N.M. 18, 780 P.2d 1165 (Ct. App. 1989).
69. Id. at 19, 780 P.2d at 1166.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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In June of 1988, Melvin B., Sr. disappeared, leaving Melvin B., Jr.
with Ms. Voelkel. 72 Melvin B., Jr. was removed from Ms. Voelkel's
custody in August of 1988 and returned to the foster home where he
lived prior to residing in Ohio with his father and Ms. Voelkel.
73
At a periodic review hearing regarding the disposition of the custody
issue, Ms. Voelkel moved to intervene. 74 As grounds for the motion she
stated that she had developed a strong bond with Melvin B., Jr. and
that she believed it would be in his best interest to remain in her custody.
75
The court denied Ms. Voelkel's motion.
76
The court of appeals noted that Ms. Voelkel correctly analogized the
rules of intervention in the children's court with the rule of permissive
intervention. 77 The court's problem with Ms. Voelkel's argument was
that, while the rule allows a parent, guardian or custodian to intervene,
the court was unsure whether Ms. Voelkel, as a person in loco parentis,
7 1
qualified as a custodian. 79
Rather than discussing this issue further, the court found that even if
Ms. Voelkel was a custodian, there was no evidence that the trial court
abused its discretion when it refused to allow her to intervene.80 Because
of the absence of abuse of discretion by the trial court, the court of
appeals found that Ms. Voelkel, a person in loco parentis, could not
intervene in the custody proceeding. 8'
E. Indian Child Welfare Act
The Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA") is a federal statute designed
to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability
and security of Indian tribes and families. 82 Congress enacted the ICWA
to remedy serious problems affecting Indian children, their parents, and
their tribes caused by abusive state adoption, foster care, and parental
rights termination proceedings.83 During committee hearings concerning
the ICWA, testimony and evidence showed that state application of Anglo
standards to custody proceedings involving Indian children harmed not
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 20, 780 P.2d at 1167.
78. A person stands in loco parentis when she acts as a lawful parent "by assuming obligations
incident to the parental relationship without going through the formalities necessary to a legal
adoption." Id. (citing Fevig v. Fevig, 90 N.M. 51, 53, 599 P.2d 839, 841 (1977)).
79. "'Custodian' means a person, other than a parent or guardian, who exercises physical control,
care or custody of the child, including any employee of a residential facility or any persons providing
out-of-home care." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1989 & Supp. 1990).
80. In re Melvin B., 109 N.M. at 20, 780 P.2d at 1167.
81. Id.
82. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 7530.
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only Indian parents and children, but also greatly impacted the tribes. 4
Because the extensive removal of Indian children from tribes is detrimental
to tribal survival and authority, 5 Congress determined that any case
involving the termination of parental rights for an Indian child 6 should
be subject to certain strictures. The ICWA outlines a specific procedure
for Indian child custody proceedings when the child is not domiciled or
residing within the reservation. 7
Because New Mexico has a large Indian population both on and off
reservations, the ICWA and its procedures are significant, particularly
for state agencies involved in abuse and neglect determinations. The
ICWA transfer provision is a mechanism that allows tribal courts to
exert their jurisdiction beyond reservation boundaries in child custody
actions involving off-reservation tribal members.8 This provision modifies
the general rule that Indians living off-reservation are subject to state
jurisdiction. If a parent or custodian objects, if the tribal court declines
to accept jurisdiction, or if "good cause" exists not to transfer the
proceeding to the tribal court, the preference for tribal jurisdiction can
be blocked.89
The provision allowing a state court to refuse to transfer a custody
proceeding to tribal court for "good cause" was intended to permit
courts to apply a modified doctrine of forum non conveniens20 This
doctrine generally gives a court the discretion to decline jurisdiction in
a case when the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice are
better served by bringing the action in another forum. 9' Similarly, under
the ICWA, if a state court, rather than the tribal court, determines that
there is "good cause" for it to hear a custody case involving an Indian
child, the state court will deny transfer.
Although "good cause" is not defined within the ICWA, the Bureau
of Indian Affairs ("BIA") has drafted guidelines for determining the
existence of "good cause. ' 92 These guidelines, although not intended to
84. Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
85. See id.
86. Under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, '"indian child' means any unmarried person
who is under age 18 and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe." Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 4, 92 Stat. 3069, 3070 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1988)).
87. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 7530, 7544.
91. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 589 (5th ed. 1979).
92. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584-95
(1979). The guidelines provide:
C.3. Determination of Good Cause to the Contrary.
(a) Good cause not to transfer the proceeding exists if the Indian child's
tribe does not have a tribal court as defined by the Act to which the case
can be transferred.
(b) Good cause not to transfer the proceeding may exist if any of the
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have binding legislative effect, do offer some guidance to the state courts.
1. Parents' Rights under the Act
In In re Wayne R.N., 9a the respondents appealed the trial court's
decision to terminate their parental rights. The basis of the appeal was
that the trial court was required to transfer the case to the tribal court
of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma.9 Both parents were
residents of Colfax County, New Mexico. 9 The father was a member
of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma.96 The mother was
non-Indian.Y7
At the beginning of the trial on the merits, and six months after
receiving notice of the proceeding, the parents petitioned for a transfer
to the tribal court, 98 which the trial court denied. 99 The trial court noted
on the record that the petition was not timely and that no reasonable
likelihood that the tribes would accept jurisdiction existed.1'0 In addition,
the trial court's formal findings indicated that the tribes had been notified
and had consented to state jurisdiction.' 0'
On appeal, the parents argued that the trial court was required to
transfer the case to their tribal court in Oklahoma under the provisions
of the ICWA. 02 The parents further argued that the transfer provision
of the ICWA is mandatory and that the trial court erred when it refused
to transfer the matter. 0 3
following circumstances exists:
(i) The proceeding was at an advanced stage when the petition to
transfer was received and the petitioner did not file the petition
promptly after receiving notice of the hearing.
(ii) The Indian child is over twelve years of age and objects to
the transfer.
(iii) The evidence necessary to decide the case could not be ade-
quately presented in the tribal court without undue hardship to
the parties or the witnesses.
(iv) The parents of a child over five years of age are not available
and the child has had little or no contact with the child's tribe or
members of the child's tribe.
(c) Socio-economic conditions and the perceived adequacy of tribal or BIA
social services or judicial systems may not be considered in a determination
that good cause exists.
(d) The burden of establishing good cause to the contrary shall be on the
party opposing the transfer.
Id.
93. 107 N.M. 341, 757 P.2d 1333 (Ct. App. 1988).
94. Id. at 342, 757 P.2d at 1334.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 342-43, 757 P.2d at 1334-35.
99. Id. at 343, 757 P.2d at 1335.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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The court of appeals found that good cause not to transfer existed
and affirmed the trial court's decision. 'c4The court of appeals listed three
grounds for finding good cause not to transfer: (1) tribal participation
in the proceedings; (2) the untimeliness of the petition; (3) and the doctrine
of forum non conveniens.105 First, the tribes' legal representative was
present at all hearings.'°6 The representative stated that the tribes were
opposed to transferring the case to the tribal court at that point in the
proceedings.107 The legal representative indicated that the tribes had a
policy against accepting transfers of cases in which the child, the parents,
the witnesses, and all of the evidence were in another state.108 Second,
respondents petitioned for transfer six months after service, on the morn-
ing the trial was to begin.' °9 Third, because all of the evidence was
located in New Mexico, the expense and difficulty of forcing witnesses
to travel to Oklahoma would impose an undue hardship on the witnesses,
thus invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens."10 Under these
circumstances, the court of appeals found good cause not to transfer the
case to the tribal court in Oklahoma."'
Other cases have found good cause not to transfer when the petition
for transfer is received after the proceedings are at an advanced stage.
For example, in In re Laurie R. ,I12 the aunt of an Indian child moved
the child from Montana to Taos, New Mexico at the mother's request." 3
The child was an enrolled member of her deceased father's tribe, the
Cheyenne-Arapaho. 114 The mother was a non-Indian resident of Mon-
tana."5 Based on information from the aunt, the Human Services De-
partment proceeded in state court against the mother for child neglect." 6
The court awarded the Department custody of the child." 7 The Department
then petitioned for termination of the mother's parental rights."' During
the trial on the merits, the mother orally requested transfer of the
proceedings to the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribal Court." 9 Neither the tribe
nor the mother filed a written petition to transfer the case to the tribal
court. 20 The ICWA, however, does not specify whether the petition can
be oral or must be written.' 21
104. Id. at 344, 757 P.2d at 1336.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 343, 757 P.2d at 1335.
110. Id. at 344, 757 P.2d at 1336.
111. Id.
112. 107 N.M. 529, 760 P.2d 1295 (Ct. App. 1988).
113. Id. at 530, 760 P.2d at 1296.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 532-33 760 P.2d at 1298-99.
120. Id. at 533, 760 P.2d at 1299.
121. Id.
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The trial court determined that good cause existed to proceed and
denied the transfer.'22 The court based its decision on two factors. First,
the record indicated that the tribe executed a written waiver of partic-
ipation in the proceeding. 12 Second, the BIA guidelines provide that good
cause may exist to deny a transfer if the proceedings are at an advanced
stage when the petition to transfer is received.1u In this case, the trial
court received the petition after the trial had commenced."' After a trial
on the merits, the court terminated the mother's parental rights.'
26
The mother argued on appeal that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case because the case was governed by the ICWA. 127
The mother contended that the proceeding should have been transferred
at her request from the Taos District Court to the Cheyenne-Arapaho
Tribal Court. 12 As authority for her argument, the mother cited section
1911(b) of the ICWA. 129 The court of appeals upheld the trial court's
decision because of the tribe's executed written waiver of participation
and the advanced stage of the proceedings when the petition was re-
ceived. 130
2. Tribe's Right of Intervention on Appeal
Section 1911(c) of the ICWA gives both the Indian custodian 3' of a
child and the Indian child's tribe3 2 the right to intervene at any point
in a proceeding regarding the custody of an Indian child. 33 In In re
Begay, 34 the court of appeals addressed this section of the ICWA.
In that case, the mother, a Picuris Pueblo woman, voluntarily consented
to the termination of her parental rights and consented to an adoption
in state court.'35 She was a domiciliary of the Picuris Pueblo and gave
birth to a child out of wedlock, off-reservation, at the Indian Health
Service Hospital in Santa Fe. 36 The child was placed with a Navajo
family in compliance with the mother's request for the child to be placed
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 530, 760 P.2d at 1296.
127. Id. at 533, 760 P.2d at 1299.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. "'Indian custodian' means any Indian person who has legal custody of an Indian child under
tribal law or custom or under State law or to whom temporary physical care, custody, and control
has been transferred by the parent of such child." 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6) (1988).
132. "'Indian child's tribe' means (a) the Indian tribe in which an Indian child is a member or
eligible for membership or (b), in the case of an Indian child who is a member of or eligible for
membership in more than one tribe, the Indian tribe with which the Indian child has the more
significant contacts." § 1903(5).
133. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1988).
134. 107 N.M. 810, 765 P.2d 1178 (Ct. App. 1988).
135. Id. at 812, 765 P.2d at 1180.
136. Id.
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with a non-Picuris Indian family. 37 Later, the Navajo family petitioned
for adoption. 38
Picuris Pueblo received notice of the adoption but did not enter an
appearance. 3 9 However, the tribe contacted the mother, who later filed
a withdrawal of her prior consent to adoption.Y° The mother also filed
a motion to dismiss the adoption proceeding for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and to regain custody of her child.' 4' Before the trial court
ruled on the mother's motion, the Picuris tribal court determined that
the mother was a domiciliary of the Picuris Pueblo. 142 The tribal court
judge also filed an affidavit in the state trial court certifying the tribal
court's authority and willingness to assume jurisdiction over the pro-
ceeding. 143
The trial court denied the mother's motion to dismiss and to regain
custody without making factual determinations on domicile. 44 The basis
for the ruling was that the mother had no standing absent the tribe's
joining in the motion to invalidate the proceeding. 45
On interlocutory appeal, the mother raised the question of error by
the trial court in denying her motion to dismiss the adoption proceedings
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as required by the ICWA.' 46 She
argued that: (1) the Picuris tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction because
the child's domicile was within the reservation; (2) the Picuris tribal
court's determination of domicile was entitled to full faith and credit;
and (3) her earlier consent to adoption was invalid because the state
court approving consent lacked jurisdiction. 47
The court of appeals confined its opinion to its understanding of the
basis for the state court's ruling denying the mother's motion to dismiss-
the mother had no standing absent the tribe's joining the motion. 48 The
court of appeals first determined whether the tribe waived its right to
intervene by failing to intervene at the trial level. 49 Section 1911(c) of
title 25 of the United States Code provides that "[tihe Indian custodian
of the child and the Indian child's tribe shall have a right to intervene
at any point in the proceeding."' 50 The court emphasized the words "at
any point" and construed them as including the appeals process. 5' The
court found that the tribe's joinder was not required and reversed and
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 811, 765 P.2d at 1179.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 812, 765 P.2d at 1180.
145. Id. at 811, 765 P.2d at 1179.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 812, 765 P.2d at 1180.
150. Id. at 812-13, 765 P.2d at 1180-81.
151. Id. at 812, 765 P.2d at 1180.
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remanded for consideration of the jurisdictional issue.'52 In addition, the
court noted that the courts have been reluctant to imply a waiver of
Indian rights, concluding that the tribe's waiver of the right to intervene
must be express and not simply an omission."' Because the tribe did
not expressly waive its right to intervene, the court of appeals granted
intervenor status to the tribe. 1
4
The court of appeals refrained from addressing whether the trial court
lacked jurisdiction based on the child's domicile. 5 The court reasoned
that because the trial court did not determine the child's domicile because
of judicial restraint, it should not extend its scope of review beyond
what the trial court deemed was the controlling issue. 5 6 Therefore, the
court remanded the case to the district court for a determination of the
child's domicile. 157
III. CHILD SUPPORT AND ENFORCEMENT
A. Denial of Visitation as Defense and Waiver
In New Mexico, a parent must provide child support payments according
to the guidelines established by statute unless the court orders otherwise. 5 8
While New Mexico recognizes virtually any valid defense in a proceeding
for enforcement of a child support order,5 9 denial of visitation has not
previously been accepted as such a valid defense.16
In Williams v. Williams,161 the court of appeals considered whether a
denial of visitation can constitute a child support payment defense in
exceptional circumstances. In that case, the parties divorced in New
Mexico when their son was nineteen months old. 162 The mother was
awarded sole custody, 163 and the father received reasonable visitation
rights. 1 The father was also ordered to pay child support into 'a bank
account. 165 Subsequently, the mother took the child out of state, moved
several times, and never notified the father of their whereabouts.'6 After
several attempts to locate the mother and child, the father discontinued
depositing child support into the account. 167 Ten years later, the mother
returned to New Mexico and commenced efforts to collect child support
152. Id. at 813, 765 P.2d at 1181.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 813-14, 765 P.2d at 1181-82.
156. Id. at 814, 765 P.2d at 1182.
157. Id.
158. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-4-11.1 to -11.2. (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
159. See Mask v. Mask, 95 N.M. 229, 620 P.2d 883 (1980).
160. See Fullen v. Fullen, 21 N.M. 212, 153 P. 294 (1915); see also Dillard v. Dillard, 104 N.M.
763, 727 P.2d 71 (Ct. App. 1986).
161. 109 N.M. 92, 781 P.2d 1170 (Ct. App. 1989).
162. Id. at 93, 781 P.2d at 1171.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 94, 781 P.2d at 1172.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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arrearages. 168 The district court denied her request for arrearages, and
she appealed. 169
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that
denial of visitation, although traditionally not a valid defense to payment
of child support, may be a defense in extreme cases. 170 Specifically, an
exception exists when a non-custodial parent can prove that the custodial
parent concealed the location of the child, and the non-custodial parent
made reasonable efforts to locate the custodial parent and the child.'17
The court held that because the mother refused to allow court-ordered
visitation, and the father made reasonable efforts to locate the mother
and child, a valid defense existed.' 72
The court stated that an agreement to waive child support arrearages
that have already accrued constitutes a valid waiver to the collection of
those arrearages as long as the agreement is supported by sufficient
consideration and does not infringe on the rights of third parties. 73
Additionally, the court held that waiver of child support arrearages or
the right to ongoing support can also arise from intentional conduct or
acts inconsistent with claiming the legal right. 17 4 "No consideration is
required to support this type of waiver.' ' 75
The court held that the mother waived her right to arrearages by
intentional conduct. 76 The court based its decision on evidence that the
mother told the father that she did not want his money and that she
did not want him to ever see the child again. 77
B. Dischargeability of Support Obligations in Bankruptcy
According to federal bankruptcy law, alimony, maintenance, and child
support are nondischargeable debts. 178 Additionally, any debt in the nature
of alimony, maintenance, or child support is a nondischargeable debt. 7 9
However, courts may consider whether the nondischargeable obligation
is manifestly unreasonable.1 80
In Hopkins v. Hopkins,8' the spouses agreed in their divorce settlement
that the mother would assume liability for the first mortgage on the
family home. The father would assume debts secured by the second and
third mortgages on the home. 82 Subsequently, the father filed for bank-
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 97-98, 781 P.2d at 1175-76.
171. Id. at 98, 781 P.2d at 1176.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 99, 781 P.2d at 1177.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 99-100, 781 P.2d at 1177-78.
177. Id. at 100, 781 P.2d at 1178.
178. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (Supp. 1989).
179. Id. § 523(a)(5)(B).
180. Id.
181. 109 N.M. 233, 784 P.2d 420 (Ct. App. 1989).
182. Id. at 235, 784 P.2d at 422.
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ruptcy. Is3 The mother sought to hold the former husband in contempt
for failure to pay the second and third mortgages on the marital home. 1 4
The district court held the husband in contempt and the husband ap-
pealed.' 5
The husband argued that the second and third mortgage debts were
not alimony, maintenance, or child support. 116 He contended that the
obligation was a property division. 8 7 He also argued that the parties
specifically stated in the divorce agreement that no alimony would be
awarded.' However, the court held that the obligation functioned as
support because it was necessary for the mother and children to continue
living in the family home.8 9
The court extended its analysis to include an inquiry into the reason-
ableness of the award. The court of appeals adopted a test for determining:
(1) whether the agreed obligation to support a former spouse or child
is manifestly unreasonable under traditional concepts of support; and (2)
whether the court must set a reasonable limit on the nondischargeability
of the debt in bankruptcy. 19 The court held that in determining whether
an obligation is reasonable, it "must consider the relative earning ability
of each of the parties, their financial status including other means of
support, and prior work experience.. .. "19 Additionally, the court must
consider whether, at the time the debts were assumed, the obligation
exceeded the debtor's ability to pay. 192 The court remanded the case to
the trial court to consider the reasonableness of the father's obligation
to the mother both at the time of the decree and at the time of the
bankruptcy. 193
IV. COMMUNITY PROPERTY DETERMINATIONS
During the survey period, a number of appellate cases addressed the
division of property after a dissolution of marriage. This section discusses
the valuation of goodwill, military benefits, community and personal
debts, and expenses during divorce proceedings.
A. Goodwill
New Mexico courts have struggled when faced with identifying, valuing
and dividing the goodwill of a professional business. 194 Goodwill can be
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 234, 784 P.2d at 421.
186. Id. at 238, 784 P.2d at 425.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 240, 784 P.2d at 427.
190. Id. This analysis was first established in In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983).
191. Hopkins, 109 N.M. at 240, 784 P.2d at 427.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 241, 784 P.2d at 428.
194. "A typical definition of goodwill identifies it as that portion of the fair market value of
a business in excess of its net asset or book value." 1. ELLMAN, P. KURTZ & A. STANTON, FAMILY
LAW 301 (1986) [hereinafter ELMAN & KURTZ].
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a devisible asset and can often be the most valuable marital asset possessed
by a couple.195 However, companies are developing various ways of keeping
an employee's spouse from seeking part of the business in a divorce
settlement. 196
In the 1983 case of Hertz v. Hertz,197 a law firm had created a
shareholder's agreement restricting the value of goodwill. 98 Throughout
the existence of the firm, there had been over 150 sales and purchases
of the firm's stock with no amount paid or reduced for goodwill.' 99 A
shareholder's spouse argued that the community share of goodwill should
not be determined by the firm's restrictive agreement. 200 The New Mexico
Supreme Court held that the shareholder's agreement was a valid valuation
of the business' goodwill because the shareholders had not previously
disregarded the agreement. 201
In Cox v. Cox,202 a small accounting firm created a shareholder's
agreement providing that book value for the shares of the firm could
not include any amount for goodwill. 20 3 The agreement was dated twenty-
nine days after the wife of one of the partners filed for divorce. 204
Additionally, the agreement was not signed by all of the shareholders
until approximately one year later. 25
The wife valued the community interest in the goodwill of her husband's
accounting firm at some amount between $109,200 and $171,096.206 How-
ever, the trial court made no award for goodwill, concluding that the
shareholder's agreement was controlling on the valuation of goodwill
because the shareholders never disregarded the agreement after it was
created. 207 The wife appealed. 20 8
The court of appeals examined the issue of whether the Hertz rule
applies to all situations in which there is a stock restriction agreement. 2°9
The court held that the rule does not apply in all cases and distinguished
Cox from Hertz.20 First, the agreement in Cox was dated twenty-nine
days after the wife filed for divorce, while the agreement in Hertz had
been in effect for a number of years and had a history of over 150
transactions in which it had been honored. 2" Second, in Hertz, the
195. Id.
196. Id. at 302.
197. 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169 (1983).
198. Id. at 323, 657 P.2d at 1172.
199. Id. at 325, 657 P.2d at 1174.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 326, 657 P.2d at 1175.
202. 108 N.M. 598, 775 P.2d 1315 (1989).
203. Id. at 599, 775 P.2d at 1316.
204. Id. at 600, 775 P.2d at 1317.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 600-01, 775 P.2d at 1317-18.
211. Id. at 600, 775 P.2d at 1317.
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shareholder spouse apparently did not invest in the firm.21 2 However, in
Cox, the husband and wife purchased the accounting firm's goodwill by
borrowing money from several sources and using community assets as
a portion of the collateral for the loans. 2 3 Additionally, they used com-
munity income to make payments on the loan. 214 Third, while the law
firm in Hertz was unlikely to be sold, the accounting firm in Cox was
much more susceptible to a sale. 215
Thus, the court found that Cox was sufficiently distinguishable to make
the Cox rule inapplicable. 21 6 However, the court emphasized that its COx
decision did not modify or ignore Hertz.
27
B. Military Disability Retirement Benefits
Historically, state courts followed their own community property prin-
ciples when determining the community or separate property nature of
military retirement and disability pay.218 However, in McCarty v.
McCarty,2 9 the United States Supreme Court held that state community
property principles were preempted by federal statutes governing military
retirement pay and that states could not treat such pay as community
property. 220 This decision was later superseded by the passage of the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act ("USFSPA"). 221 Sub-
sequently, in Mansell v. Mansell,222 the Supreme Court decided that the
USFSPA preempts states from treating military disability retirement ben-
efits as community property.
In Toupal v. Toupal,223 the New Mexico Court of Appeals was faced
with the issue of whether to give Mansell retroactive effect in order to
modify a previous trial court judgment. 224 In Toupal, the parties were
divorced in 1977.225 In 1987, after passage of the USFSPA, the trial
court divided the husband's previously undivided military disability ben-
efits as community property. 226 The husband appealed, and the judgment
was affirmed by the court of appeals. 227 After the United States Supreme
Court decided Mansell, the husband moved to modify the trial court's
decision .228
212. Id. at 601, 775 P.2d at 1318.
213. Id. at 599, 775 P.2d at 1316.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 601, 775 P.2d at 1318.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See ELLMAN & KURTZ, supra note 194, at 263-64.
219. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
220. Id. at 223.
221. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 note 1 (1988).
222. 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
223. 109 N.M. 774, 790 P.2d 1055 (Ct. App. 1990).
224. Id. at 775, 790 P.2d at 1056.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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The court of appeals used a three-prong analysis for the question of
the retroactivity of the Supreme Court's Mansell decision: (1) whether
the case established new law; (2) whether refusing to give the case
retroactive effect would significantly affect the purposes furthered by that
opinion; and (3) whether retroactive application would have an adverse
impact on the judicial system and cause significant hardship for spouses
forced to repay retirement payments received prior to the decision.229
Applying this analysis, the court of appeals held, first, that Mansell
overruled the judgment for the wife treating disability pay as community
property.20 Second, the court determined that refusal to give the Mansell
decision retroactive effect would not impinge on any important purpose
furthered by the decision. 23' Last, the court held that if Mansell were
applied retroactively, ex-spouses receiving military disability retirement
payments as community property would face the prospect of repaying
such payments. 232 Thus, after applying the three-prong analysis and con-
sidering the doctrine of res judicata,233 the court decided that Mansell
should not be given retroactive effect. 234
C. Attorney's Fees
According to the New Mexico Community Property Act ("Act"), 235
community debts shall first be satisfied from community property236 and
separate debts shall be satisfied from the debtor spouse's separate
property. 237 The Act defines a community debt as a debt contracted or
incurred by either spouse during the marriage which is not a separate
debt. 238 A court may declare a debt to be unreasonable if it was incurred
by a spouse while the spouse was living apart and the debt did not
contribute to the benefit of both spouses or their dependents. 239 If a debt
is declared unreasonable, it is the separate debt of the spouse incurring
such expense.
240
In Bustos v. Gilroy,24' the wife disputed the finding that her attorney's
fees and legal costs incurred as a result of the divorce were her separate
debt. 242 The wife argued that legal expenses incurred pursuant to a divorce
are presumptively a community debt. 4 3
229. Id. at 776, 790 P.2d at 1057.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. The court held that the doctrine of res judicata was a viable alternative ground for its
decision. "Res judicata effects of a decision are not altered by the fact that the decision rests on
case law overruled in a later case." Id.
234. Id. at 777, 790 P.2d at 1058.
235. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3-6 to -17 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
236. § 40-3-11.
237. § 40-3-10.
238. § 40-3-9(B).
239. § 40-3-10.1.
240. Id.
241. 106 N.M. 808, 751 P.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1988.
242. Id. at 809, 751 P.2d at 189.
243. Id.
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The court of appeals held that such legal expenses are not presumptively
community debts, but that part of the wife's debt could constitute a
communal expense. 2" The court analyzed the unreasonableness of the
debt as defined in the statutes, 245 and it held that both conditions-living
apart and no community benefit-must be satisfied for a debt to be
declared unreasonable. 246 The court held that although the parties were
living apart, the attorney's fees concerning the issues of child custody,
visitation, and support benefitted the children. 247 Thus, the debt was not
unreasonable and was a community debt. 248
D. Imputed Rent in Cases Involving Constructive Ouster of Spouse
New Mexico courts allow a spouse who has been constructively ousted
from the family home to be reimbursed for part of the home's reasonable
rental value from the spouse remaining in the home.249 In Olivas v.
Olivas,2 50 the supreme court examined the meaning of "constructive ouster."
In Olivas, the wife was the exclusive occupant of the house after the
parties separated. 25' The husband argued that the wife constructively ousted
him from the house and that he was entitled to one-half of the reasonable
rental value of the home from the time of the initial separation. 25 2 The
district court failed to find a constructive ouster. 253
On appeal, the court of appeals found that the husband was not
constructively ousted from the community residence. 254 The court rec-
ognized that ouster usually suggests an affirmative physical act; however,
some situations prevent the cotenants from sharing occupancy through
no fault of either cotenant. 2"1 The court, realizing the impossibilities and
impracticalities of divorcing spouses remaining in the same household
during the actual proceedings, applied the theory of constructive ouster
to the marital context. 2 6 The court did not create a presumption of
constructive ouster when one spouse leaves the home. 257 Rather, it allowed
the departing spouse to prove ouster by showing that both parties agreed
they could no longer live together. 258
In Olivas, evidence showed that the husband chose to leave the family
home to live with a girlfriend and that his departure was the reason for
244. Id.
245. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-10.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
246. Bustos, 106 N.M. at 809, 751 P.2d at 189.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 811, 751 P.2d at 191.
249. See Hertz v. Hertz, 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169 (1983).
250. 108 N.M. 814, 780 P.2d 640 (Ct. App. 1989).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 818, 780 P.2d at 644.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 816-17, 780 P.2d at 642-43.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 818, 780 P.2d at 644.
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the divorce. 2 9 The husband did not move out because the parties agreed
they could no longer live together. 260 Therefore, the court refused to find
constructive ouster. However, the court, in dicta, conceded that hostility
between spouses may be enough to show constructive ouster in other
situations .261
V. CONCLUSION
While the family law cases examined in this survey set forth no
important new legal principles, they do provide further interpretation of
specific issues in the areas of custody, child support, and the division
of community property upon dissolution of marriage which may be of
interest to the practitioner in domestic relations cases.
KATHY A. PACK
DARLA M. SILVA
259. Id.
260. Id. at 816, 780 P.2d at 642.
261. Id. at 818, 780 P.2d at 644.
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